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Legitimation Crisis and the Greek Explosion 
 
Events belie forecasts; to the extent that events are historic, they upset 
calculations.  They may even overturn strategies that provided for their 
possible occurrence.  Because of their conjunctural nature, events upset 
the structures which made them possible. 
     - Henri Lefebvre, The Explosion 
 
 The dramatic upheavals in Greece, sparked by the December 2008 murder of a 
fifteen-year-old student by the police, have been the focus of much interest and 
speculation.  This ‘explosion’ has been one of the most acute challenges to the Greek 
political establishment since the end of the Greek Civil War.  By the end of December, 
roughly 800 buildings (mainly in Athens but also in almost every other major urban 
center within Greece) had been torched, including many banks and government buildings 
such as police stations and the main courthouse in Athens.  Daily clashes with police 
became the norm.1  Despite government efforts to paint the uprising as the work of a few 
small groups and criminals, 60% of Greeks categorized the events as a ‘popular uprising’, 
according to a mid-December poll (Agence France-Presse 2008). Most every 
international news service featured dramatic images and story lines regarding the scope 
and intensity of the conflicts between the police and their antagonists.  In Spain, 
Germany, France, Turkey, Russia, Italy, and elsewhere, those sympathetic to the Greek 
uprising and those with similar concerns and goals staged their own demonstrations.  
Nicolas Sarkozy, fearing that the intensity of the Greek explosion could easily spread to 
                                                
1 The assault continues, with attacks on banks particularly common, a situation that 
Andreas Kalyvas (2009) has termed a ‘low intensity civil war’, akin to Italy in the 1970s. 
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France, postponed his controversial education reforms; stating, “We do not want a 
European May ’68 in the middle of Christmas. (Sunday Times 2008).” 
 In the face of this unexpected and shocking uprising, two key factors were 
stressed by the vast majority of commentators and media ‘experts’ trying to make sense 
of the events.2  First, that Greeks have a propensity for and ingrained history of direct 
political action, especially among students, and that the 1973 student protest against the 
Junta was a sort of precursor or model for the current uprising.  Second, that the current 
economic situation in Greece and the plight of the many university educated but 
unemployed or underemployed youth, the now famous ‘€700 generation’, was a key 
factor behind the upheavals.   
 Both of these arguments are extremely tenuous and do little to shed light on the 
situation.  To begin with, the current upheavals have been much more widespread and 
radical in their character than the anti-junta uprising of November 1973.  It is important 
to remember that the anti-junta student movement was very liberal in character, largely in 
                                                
2 Unsurprisingly, analyses by commentators and academics have followed the Lacanian 
dictum that ‘the letter always reaches its destination’.  Such commentators have largely 
received the message from these events that reflects their own political and ideological 
viewpoints (indeed, the naming of the ‘events’ itself is a significant sign of this, whether 
the term that ought to be used she be ‘riot’ or ‘movement’ or ‘protest’, and so on.)  For 
some, Stathis Kalyvas for example, ‘the riots’ have little political content, they are the 
product of permissiveness on the part of the Greek state, which has not sufficiently 
cracked down and suppressed a propensity among some Greeks for disruptive and violent 
demonstrations (Kalyvas 2008).  The recent collection, The Return of Street Politics? 
Essays on the December Riots in Greece (Economides and Monastiriotis eds. 2009), 
published by the Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics, reflects the 
overall neo-liberal and technocratic character of those who fund and staff the 
Observatory.  Reading this publication gives the impression that the key sources of the 
‘riots’ stem from the lack of labor market, education, and administrative reforms in the 
last two decades.  Not enough liberalism seems to have been the key to the crisis.  How 
else to explain unemployment or corruption in Greece?  I suspect that those in the streets 
would be surprised to know that what their actions were really saying was that Greece 
was in need of more authoritarian liberalism. 
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defense of civil liberties and electoral politics.  There is no doubt that the left, including 
both Communist parties at that time (the ‘external’ pro-Soviet version and the ‘internal’ 
Eurocommunist version), were very involved in the anti-junta movement but the 
substance of the resistance was very much in line with liberal values.  Moreover, as much 
as the November 1973 efforts served as a transformative moment for those who 
participated in them as well as for subsequent leftist generations, it is simply false to 
assume that, given this history, by virtue of being young or a university student one is 
automatically aligned with the left or has a propensity for direct action against the state.  
In fact, in university elections from the 80s through today, students were far more likely 
to support the youth versions of the mainstream center-right or center-left parties of New 
Democracy and PASOK than any left wing party.3  Similarly, the idea that 
unemployment or underemployment is the key factor behind the uprisings is simply a 
vulgar reduction that does not take into account the political mediations and 
particularities of the situation.  After all, levels of unemployment in Greece are not very 
different from those in Italy, Portugal and Spain and if low wages and lack of 
employment opportunities were sufficient causes of political upheaval then cities such as 
Detroit, Cleveland, and Baltimore should be in flames at this very moment.   
 Given the foregoing, how can we begin to make sense of the current political 
situation in Greece?  What factors have made the Greek explosion possible?  In the 
remainder of this necessarily brief and tenuous attempt to understand the conditions of 
possibility behind this explosion, I will highlight two interrelated sets of factors: how the 
                                                
3 For example, in the student elections of 2008 New Democracy (DAP) received 39% of 
the votes in the senior universities and 48% in the technical and vocational schools while 
PASOK (PASP) received 26% and 28% respectively (Odigitis 2008, 11).  
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political space that this explosion occurred within was produced and how the legitimacy 
of the Greek state was eroded to the point that such a direct and forceful attack was made 
possible. 
The ‘Void’ in Greek Politics 
 The Greek state has always been prone to periodic crises of legitimacy and has 
often resorted to heavy-handed attempts to coerce consent, as was manifest in the Civil 
War of 1946-49, the Junta of 1967-74, the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936-41, and many 
other less extreme examples.  None-the-less, through the 19th and most of the 20th 
centuries, key mechanisms existed which both functioned to produce legitimacy and to 
bridge the gap between centralized state power and the agency of the popular classes.  
For example, episodically (most recently in the 1970s, until most labor unions were 
neutered through their colonization by PASOK) a strong labor movement emerged which 
was not confined to simple ‘private’ professional questions but served as a bridge to the 
core of state power.  Villages and small towns were traditionally organized into 
‘communities’, an administrative level below municipalities and prefectures, where the 
popular participation of residents also helped bridge the gap between centralized state 
power and concrete communities.  This was eliminated in the late 1990s under the 
‘Capodistrias Plan’, with the number of local administrative units being reduced by 80% 
in the name of efficiency and Europeanization.4  Both of these examples, and other 
similar changes, in part help explain the creation of this empty political space, the void, 
within which the explosion of December 2008 occurred and which made possible the 
reemergence of spontaneous political action. 
                                                
4 It should be emphasized that this has no significant impact on the political organization 
of cities. 
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 However, education and clientelism have been the most fundamental mechanisms 
through which the Greek state has been able to legitimize its power and the broader 
structure of society more generally, with clientelism being the key bridge between state 
power and popular agency (cf. Mouzelis 1978; Tsoukalas 1985).  Clientelist networks, a 
mainstay of Ottoman rule as well as the Greek state, allowed for common citizens to have 
some degree of influence through their patrons, very similar to ways that ordinary people 
secured a political voice through machine politics during the Progressive Era in the 
United States.  This not only helped cement party loyalties and the power of local party 
leaders, it also was fundamental for the legitimation of political power more broadly 
regardless of the party in power.  Since all loyal party members stood to, or at least hoped 
to, gain from the typical distribution of favors and resources by their patrons, ‘normal’ 
Greek politics was a game that was of potential benefit to all concerned.  Given that 
capitalism in Greece developed in a very peculiar and slow fashion, in comparison with 
the West at least, the state served as the main mechanism for the accumulation of wealth.  
Even by the 1880s, the salary of high government officials (ministers or ambassadors for 
example) was more than the yearly profits of the largest capitalist enterprise in Greece at 
that time (a textiles mill) (Tsoukalas, 1981). As such, the Greek state played an unusually 
powerful role in the social accumulation of wealth and, through client-patron relations, 
the sharing of this wealth with party clients served to cement their loyalty to their patrons, 
legitimize state power, and bridge the gap between a very centralized state and significant 
factions of the popular classes. 
 Characteristically, the political crisis that was concurrent with the fall of the Junta 
in 1974 was met with a redistribution of wealth by way of clientelism as well as some 
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new welfare state programs.  From 1974 to 1986, there was a doubling of the number of 
people employed in the public sector; by 1990 the total number of public employees was 
estimated to be in excess of 700,000 (Charalambis et. al. 2004, 237).  Most tellingly, fully 
one half to two thirds of all university graduates in the 70s and 80s were employed by the 
state (Tsoukalas 1996, 205).  The student ‘radicals’ of 1973, but not only, were very well 
integrated into the sinews of the Greek state.  This occurred within a period of remarkable 
economic expansion.  From the early 50s through the mid 80s, Greece was transformed 
from a largely rural and relatively poor society to one that was urban, increasingly 
affluent, and fully committed to the typical Western patterns and values of mass 
consumption.  Significantly, the per capita grown of private consumption from 1961 to 
1977 was 142% (Tsoukalas 1996, 214).  I stress these points in order to highlight how 
peculiar this pattern of growth actually was during the so-called ‘Greek economic 
miracle’.  For, although Greece became a modern bourgeois society in many ways it was 
able to avoid many of the less desirable elements of capitalism, namely the 
commodification of labor.  The economic expansion in Greece at this time did not 
correspond to a transformation of the labor market or a significant increase in wage labor.  
The economic growth, made possible largely through foreign remittances and a 
continuing pattern of emigration from Greece as well as significant increases in tourism, 
shipping, banking, and other examples of ‘comprador’ capitalism, occurred with 
relatively all the growth of employment within the state together with a corresponding 
increase in self-employment (as well as the informal economy).  So, although Greece 
went through a very rapid and significant moment of economic expansion, Greeks largely 
avoided the disciplining effects and insecurities of the private labor market. 
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 The question of education is fundamental in this context.  Given the limited 
presence of capitalism and the paucity of the ‘private’ labor market, Greeks were faced 
with three options: work for the state, emigrate, or work the family farm/small business.  
Public employment was the best and safest way to escape a life of tilling the fields or 
mending the fishing nets.  However, a university education was a prerequisite for most 
significant positions within the state.  The attainment of academic credentials became a 
sufficient condition to secure one’s life chances and to live a life of petit bourgeois 
security and comfort.  Accordingly, the Greek educational system was one that was 
wholly focused on training students for entering the university system; there were no 
technical schools and no tracking within schools.  All students, regardless of class 
background, ‘aptitude’, or geographic location, were subject to exactly the same 
curricula, teaching techniques and, more or less, quality of teachers.  It was not until 1929 
that the first technical schools were introduced in Greece, and even then they failed since 
very few parents were willing to send their children to such schools (cf. Tsoukalas, 
1985). That the state functioned to accumulate wealth and distribute it to those at the top 
of the state machinery may have been obvious to all but the egalitarian character of the 
Greek educational system and the meritocracy this represented when it came to the 
securing of public employment did much to legitimize not only this pattern of state-
dependent class formation but political power more generally.  A universal, academically 
rigorous, curriculum and free higher education have been the cornerstone of the 
legitimacy of the Greek state.  Tellingly, even today Greeks seem to value free education 
higher than any civil or political right.  In a 1990 survey, when asked how much they 
would be annoyed if abolished, 85.5% responded ‘very much’ when it came to free 
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education as opposed to 71.9% when it came to the right to vote, 52.5% for the right to 
strike, 36.7% for the right to demonstrate, and 58.8% for the right to political parties 
(Tsoukalas 1996, 207). 
 It is in the context that the current crisis of political legitimacy in Greece can be 
better understood.  When the current regime attempted to ‘reform’ higher education last 
year with its attempt to recognize private universities and introduce more managerialism 
to the Greek public universities, this was meet by strong resistance on the part of 
students, especially high school students.5  The proposed reforms were interpreted as an 
attack on free higher education and as an attempt to rationalize universities according to 
market principles.  One of the peculiar aspects of the December events was the number of 
high school students who took to the streets.  This can be traced back to the spring and 
summer of last year where many of these students were radicalized, and took to the 
streets, in opposition to the education reforms. 
 Concurrent to all of this is the corresponding crisis of the political parties and the 
clientelist system.  The great increase in public employment noted earlier waned in the 
90s.  The conditions that allowed for the ‘Greek miracle’ had ended.  Lists of university 
graduates waiting for a permanent position in the public sector grew so much that many 
job seekers would have been of retirement age before they began working.   Not only did 
public sector employment stagnate, it began to decrease substantially.  Under the pressure 
of the EU as well as the mantra of market liberalization, many public enterprises were 
privatized (as with the recent sale of Olympic Airways, and the previous privatization of 
                                                
5 Similar attempts at ‘reform’ are currently afoot across the EU, partly as a result of the 
Bologna Process and the hard line neo-liberal reforms that the EU seeks to make in 
higher education.  As in Greece, students in France, Spain, and Italy, most notably, have 
organized in opposition. 
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the national phone company and other utilities).  Moreover, some formerly well paying 
non-skilled public jobs, such as custodians for public buildings, vanished as these were 
privatized and sourced out to large agencies that rely on low-waged immigrant labor.  
The clientelist system collapsed for the simple reason that now political parties had 
increasingly fewer spoils to dole out.  This not only weakened party loyalties but, more 
importantly, makes the remaining clientelist relationships appear more and more as 
blatant political corruption, as is manifest in the near constant stream of political scandals 
and cover ups of the last few years.  It is not that such high-level clientelism was absent 
in the past, it was simply that many in the dominated classes also benefited from these 
relationships and this tempered any tendency to perceive clientelism as illegitimate on 
any level. Rather than shoring up political legitimacy, clientelism now served as a source 
of its erosion.   
 This dual development of the attack on the integrity of the educational 
apparatuses and the demise of clientelist networks that were able to incorporate large 
segments of the dominated classes has resulted in a pronounced structural crisis of the 
Greek state.  If anything saved the Greek political order up to now (beyond some well 
timed stock-market and housing bubbles as well as huge public works projects in 
preparation for the 2004 Olympics) it was the deep seeded cynicism that prevailed in 
Greece, and which also plagues most other political orders around the world.  The 
December events broke with that cynicism.  The idea that nothing can change, that the 
political game is fixed and well beyond our capacities to transform it, has now been 
brought into doubt.   
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 The ‘void’, the political space that was created by the erosion of the linkages 
between common citizens and the centralized institutions of state power, made possible 
this great explosion that we witnessed and which is still playing out.  Without recourse to 
political representation, without the voluntary servitude of public employment, without 
any reasonable alternative to the boredom and humiliation of daily life, with the great 
legitimizing idea of educational meritocracy under attack, it is little wonder that one 
spark was enough to set off a political maelstrom throughout Greece.  The cities 
throughout Greece, not only Athens, bore witness to the depth and breadth of the 
legitimation crisis of the Greek state. 
From Protest and Resistance to Organization and Social Transformation 
 The foregoing section is an obviously schematic attempt to begin to understand 
the political conditions that made the Greek explosion possible.  There is necessarily 
much more to the story.  For one, the role of immigrants in Greek society has reached a 
new moment.  Even more than native Greek students, the children of immigrants have 
many reasons to strike out against the state, and the police in particular.  Although many 
have been born in Greece and may feel themselves to be Greek, they are often without 
official papers, endure much more extreme versions of humiliation at the hands of state 
bureaucracies, and have little hope or chances of social mobility.  The children of 
immigrants are the paradigmatic example of the failure of the Greek state to incorporate 
the dominated classes into its traditional techniques of political legitimation.  In fact, one 
of the greatest achievements of the December events are the linkages that have been 
formed between the current, largely immigrant and very urban, proletariat in Greece and 
the student, anarchist, and other autonomous leftist movements.   
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  In spite of the general crisis of the state and the emergence of the proletariat and 
leftist extra-parliamentary movements as potential political subjects, the current situation 
seems unlikely to progress to anything approaching a overturning of the Greek political 
establishment.  For sure, many of the tactics used in the December events were not only 
learned in the wake of the student movement of last year which opposed the education 
reforms but were also very tied to the recent experiences of the anti-globalization 
movements.  Thousands of Greek anarchists, the Black Bloc in particular, have trained 
and been educated through their participation in anti-globalization protests throughout 
Europe.  The tactics of protest and resistance were utilized with extraordinary 
effectiveness in Greece, typically outmaneuvering the police and demonstrating a 
capacity to cause much mayhem and disruption, once again illustrating the impotence of 
the state in the face of popular movements from below.   
 However, tactical acumen and the use of mobile phones and the internet are no 
substitute for political strategy.  Without a cohesive political organization in the 
substantive sense, there is no chance for social transformation that is purposeful.  The 
fundamental ideas of Antonio Gramsci are still insightful today, the war of maneuver 
needs to be complimented by a war of position.  Unfortunately, the dominant tendency 
today, and not only in Greece, is for protest and resistance (at best) in the absence of 
political organization or strategy.  Where are the organic intellectuals of the extra-
parliamentary left?  Where are the movements for popular education?  What are the 
preconditions for the political autonomy, the self-rule, of the disenfranchised masses?  
Given the explosion, one would think that the bookstores in Athens would have long ago 
sold out (or been dispossessed) of titles from authors such as Castoriadis, Poulantzas, 
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Machiavelli, Luxemburg, Pannekoek, Korsh, and Lefebvre, or, at least, Lenin, Kropotkin, 
Bakunin, and Marx.  One would think that in back rooms and smoke-filled coffee houses 
throughout Greece, study groups and attempts at popular education would be flourishing; 
lecture halls packed with students engaged in spirited debates and serious contemplation 
of core questions; new strategies of political organization and self-rule emerging; a new 
generation of political subjects ready to embrace political autonomy emerging.  None of 
that seems to be the case. 
 Of course, it also seems very unlikely that the Greek state will be able to 
overcome its structural dilemmas anytime soon.  The agents of the Greek explosion have 
yet to rise to the level of political subjects.  Although they are very clear in their rejection 
of the ’73 generation and its complete abandonment of any progressive ideals through its 
subjection and servitude to the state, it should also be obvious to them that they have yet 
to reach a point where the mistakes of the past can be undone.  The spontaneous political 
action made possible by the void in Greek politics will also become a nostalgic memory 
rather than a decisive political break unless its participants can transform themselves into 
political subjects.  Greek politics finds itself at this crossroads, either we can expect the 
Greek state to suffer through a more or less constant legitimation crisis and protests from 
below for the foreseeable future, with little chance for any actual social transformation, or 
a deepening of the movement will occur and the subject of a new political order will 
emerge.  As bleak as the chances for the latter may be, the December events have now 
brought this possibility into existence.  In opposition to the cynicism and political malaise 
that existed before the events, a new possibility now exists.  In this sense, the shock and 
educational value of the events have already transformed the structures that made them 
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possible.  They have shown the fundamental antinomies between Europeanization qua 
liberalization and the political stability of the Greek state.  There is no longer any doubt 
as to the limitations of the authoritarian neo-liberal agenda of the EU (although, in 
Greece and elsewhere, the multiple bank bailouts and similar interventions had also very 
clearly demonstrated this point).  It is clear to all now that change is possible and maybe 
probable.  What remains to be seen is if a new political project will emerge from this 
energy and discontent with the strategies and thought necessary to realize the 
revolutionary possibilities of the moment.  
 15 
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